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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES TO 
THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
In addition to the parties identified in the caption, 
there were two other defendants in the proceeding below. 
Defendant Gerald H. Burton was dismissed before trial pursuant 
to a stipulation between the parties. Defendant City of 
Springville, a municipal corporation, prevailed on a motion for 
a directed verdict (on a governmental immunity defense) made at 
the close of all the evidence and no parties appealed from that 
directed verdict. Neither Mr. Burton nor the City of 
Springville is affected by this appeal. 
For all purposes relevant to this proceeding, 
defendants, appellants and cross-respondents The Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company and the Utah Railway Company 
are similarly situated. Both railroad companies are identified 
in this Brief and Alternative Cross-Petition as "DRGW." The 
plaintiff, respondent, and cross-appellant, Robert L. Gleave is 
referred to herein as "Mr. Gleave." The defendant-respondent, 
the Utah State Department of Transportation, is identified as 
"UDOT". UDOT is not affected by the pending petition and 
alternative cross-petition. 
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the Utah Supreme Court because DRGW respectful 1 y submits that 
jsi, uieave's certiorari petition is either frivolous or filed 
for delay, DRGW seeks an award of just damages and double 
costs, including a pro rata reduction of DRGW's post-judgment 
interest liability and reasonable attorneys' fees, for having 
to resist Mr. Gleavefs frivolous Petition for Certiorari. DRGW 
made Mr. Gleave an unconditional offer of settlement of the 
full judgment amount plus all accumulated post-judgment 
interest as of February 23, 1988. 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is 
reported at 749 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1988). A copy of the 
published opinion is reproduced at Appendix Exhibit A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision January 28, 
1988. Mr. Gleave filed a petition for rehearing February 10, 
1988 and DRGW filed a petition for rehearing February 12, 
1988. Both petitions were denied February 22, 1988. After his 
first petition for rehearing was denied, Mr. Gleave filed with 
the Court of Appeals a so-called "Motion to Suspend The Rules" 
which, if granted, would have given Mr. Gleave the 
extraordinary opportunity to file a second petition for 
rehearing. The Court of Appeals denied Mr. Gleavefs Motion to 
Suspend the Rules March 16, 1988. By order of March 15, 1988, 
the Supreme Court extended Mr. Gleavefs time for filing a 
Petition for Certiorari to April 5, 1988. By an Amended Notice 
dated May 5, 1988, the Clerk of the Supreme Court notified the 
parties that DRGW may have thirty days from that date to file a 
Brief in Opposition to Mr. Gleave's Certiorari Petition and an 
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Alternative Cross-Petition for Certiorari. Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (1953, 
as amended). 
CITATIONS TO CONTROLLING LAW 
The controlling law is provided by Rule 43 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Rule 43 is entitled 
"Considerations Governing Review of Certiorari." Mr. Gleave 
predicates his Petition for Certiorari on Rule 43(3), whereas 
DRGW predicates its Cross-Petition for Certiorari on Rule 43(4). 
DRGW's request for damages caused by Mr. Gleavefs 
frivolous Certiorari Petition must be construed in light of the 
mandatory sanction provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. Rule 33 is entitled "Damages For Delay or 
Frivolous Appeal; Recovery of Attorney's Fees." 
Supreme Court Rules 33 and 43 are reproduced at 
Appendix Exhibit E. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action arising from injuries 
sustained by Mr. Gleave April 16, 1982 when he drove his 
automobile into the path of an oncoming train owned and 
operated by the DRGW. The accident occurred at a railroad 
crossing in Springville, Utah, which was protected by advance 
warning signs, railroad crossing signs and a stop sign which 
required motorists to stop before proceeding across the 
railroad tracks. UDOT was joined as a defendant because it 
allegedly breached certain statutory duties to install adequate 
traffic warning devices at the crossing. 
In the Court of Appeals, DRGW appealed from a judgment 
based upon a jury verdict in favor of Mr. Gleave and it 
appealed an order of the lower court dismissing co-defendant 
UDOT prior to trial. In a cross-appeal to the Court of 
Appeals, Mr. Gleave appealed the lower court's order granting 
DRGWfs motion for a directed verdict as to Mr. Gleavefs claim 
for punitive damages. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court 
rulings in every respect. The case comes before the Supreme 
Court on Mr. Gleavefs Petition for Certiorari and DRGW's 
Alternative Cross-Petition for Certiorari. Due to its limited 
scope, DRGWfs Alternative Cross-Petition will not affect UDOT's 
interests even if it is granted. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION BELOW 
This action was tried before a jury in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen presiding. A pre-trial motion to dismiss 
filed by UDOT was granted on the grounds that UDOT was, in the 
lower court's opinion, immune from suit under the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed UDOT's 
dismissal. 
The case was submitted to the jury upon comparative 
negligence instructions, the court having denied DRGW's Motions 
for Summary Judgment (R. 460-61; 569-70) and for a directed 
verdict (E. 1349; 1355) requesting that Mr. Gleave be found 
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negligent as a matter of law. The jury returned its verdict, 
finding DRGW 100% at fault and Mr. Gleave 0% at fault. (R. 
765-68) The lower court entered judgment against DRGW on 
August 15, 1984, in the amount of $439,937.87 (R. 808-09). The 
lower court denied post-trial motions filed by DRGW seeking, in 
the alternative, a new trial, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, or an alteration or amendment of the judgment. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DRGW's main line tracks are crossed by a narrow, 
infrequently travelled, country road at 1600 South in 
Springville, Utah (R. 1244). In this area of Utah County, the 
railroad's tracks run generally in a north-south direction and, 
as can be seen from the numerous photographic exhibits, the 
grade for these tracks was established by making a long cut 
through a hillside which extends several hundred yards to the 
north from 1600 South. (Mr. Gleave's Trial Exhibits 2A-2G, 
2I-2M, 47, and 48; DRGWfs Trial Exhibits 22-33, and 41). This 
hillside causes a substantial obstruction of the view that an 
eastbound motorist has of a train coming from the north. 
However, since the hill essentially ends on the north side of 
1600 South, an eastbound motorist's view to his right, or 
south, is relatively unobstructed (R. 1739). 
The train in this instance was southbound and, since 
Mr. Gleave was eastbound at the time, it approached the 
crossing from Mr. Gleave's left. The crossing had the usual 
round yellow sign with a cross on it to provide an advance 
warning to motorists of the upcoming railroad crossing, and the 
usual crossbucks at the point of the crossing to denote its 
location. In addition, this crossing had a stop sign (R. 1749). 
Mr. Gleave testified that he knew he was approaching a 
railroad crossing because he had been over these tracks about 
three other times and because he had worked on the crossing 
itself as part of an asphalt paving crew in 1979 (R. 1748 and 
1757). There was enough daylight so that he was not using his 
vehicle's headlights (R. 1748), the window on the driver's side 
was almost all the way up (R. 1749), and the vehicle's heater 
was on (R. 1743). 
Mr. Gleave testified that he saw "all the warning 
signs on the road" as he approached the railroad crossing (R. 
1749 and 1757). Although Mr. Gleave never denied that: he told 
the investigating police officer that he had only "slowed down" 
for the stop sign (R. 1422--See the Officer's Report at 
Appendix Exhibit C), during trial Mr. Gleave testified that he 
came to a complete stop at the stop sign (R. 1749). 
Mr. Gleave next testified that after stopping at the 
sign and looking left, he then looked to his right (south) and 
that he continued looking to the right as he started up from 
the stop sign towards the tracks (R. 1750). He acknowledged 
that his view to the left (north) was more restricted that his 
view to the right (south), claiming that from the stop sign he 
could see about 900 feet down the tracks to his right (south), 
but only 50-100 feet up the tracks to his left (north) (R. 
1758-59). Nevertheless, he testified unequivocally that he 
travelled from the stop sign to a point where he could no 
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longer stop and avoid the collision while looking only to his 
right (R. 1759-60). He claimed that he heard the train whistle 
and saw the train as he glanced back to his left (north) while 
his car was moving (R. 1750) and that upon seeing and hearing 
the train, he immediately stopped his car (R. 1750). Mr. 
Gleave testified that he believes the train would not have hit 
his vehicle if he had stopped at the point where his vehicle 
was when he saw the train (R. 1775-76). 
DRGW train crew member Bruce Leek testified that he 
first saw Mr. Gleavefs vehicle creeping toward the crossing 
about nine seconds before the collision (R. 1813), and he saw 
Mr. Gleave stop with the nose of his automobile on the west 
rail for about 4 or 5 seconds before the automobile disappeared 
from his view under the nose of the engine shortly before the 
impact (R. 1815). He testified that the train had a "very 
loud" whistle and that the train's engineer sounded the whistle 
continuously from the quarter mile whistle post north of the 
1600 South crossing until he interrupted the normal signal with 
an emergency blowing of the whistle that continued until the 
train impacted the automobile (R. 1817-1818; and 1822). 
The train engineer, Gerald H. Burton, testified that 
the train was travelling at 50 mph, which was the designated 
speed for this train (R. 1396 and 1397). He saw Mr. Gleave's 
vehicle move slowly onto the tracks and stop (R. 1401-02) and, 
at that point in time, he interrupted the normal whistle signal 
to blow the whistle in rapid succession (R. 1402). Mr. Burton 
said that he thought Mr. Gleave had adequate time to remove his 
vehicle from the tracks in order to prevent the accident (R. 
1412). 
Sergeant David Coron of the Springville Police 
Department testified that he investigated this accident (R. 
1416-17), that he spoke with Mr. Gleave at the scene of the 
accident (R. 1419), and that Mr. Gleave was lucid at that time 
(R. 1421-22). He asked Mr. Gleave what had happened and Mr. 
Gleave said he "slowed down" for the stop sign (R. 1422; also 
Appendix Exhibit MC"). 
DRGW called as a witness Mr. Arthur Geurts, Safety 
Studies Engineer for UDOT. Mr. Geurts testified that he was 
responsible for UDOTfs hazard index rating for all railroad 
crossings in the State of Utah (R. 981). The 1600 South 
crossing was one of 1280 crossings studied by the state and the 
Federal Railroad Administration. The Federal Railroad 
Administration initially and incorrectly ranked it as the 68th 
most dangerous among the 1280 crossings. In computing this 
ranking, the Federal Railroad Administration believed that 
train speeds in the area were 70 mph (R. 989-91). Mr. Geurts 
testified that train speeds through this crossing are only 50 
mph and, by assuming 50 mph for the speed of trains in the area 
instead of 70 mph, the ranking of this crossing under the UDOT 
hazard index was changed from the 68th most dangerous to the 
353rd most dangerous of the 1280 crossings surveyed (R. 982, 
989-91). Moreover, Mr. Geurts explained that this UDOT 
evaluation was done before the stop signs were installed, 
which, of course, provided a motorist with additional crossing 
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protection and reduced the hazard (R. 983). In determining 
what crossing protection to require at a particular crossing, 
Mr. Geurts explained that UDOT considers factors such as a 
motorist's sight distance at the crossing, the speed and number 
of trains in the area, and the speed and volume of highway 
traffic at the crossing (R. 985-87). 
Mr. Joseph Bruce Yuhas, an employee of UDOT who 
participated in the survey of the 1600 South crossing in 
October of 1974, testified that the survey team considered 
factors such as the sight distances and, after fully evaluating 
the crossing, it recommended federal funds be sought to install 
flashing light signals as additional crossing protection (R. 
1247-49). The team further recommended that temporary stop 
signs be installed until federal funds for flashing signals 
become available (R. 1241, 1258-59). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
MR. GLEAVE?S PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED 
As DRGW understands the purpose of a Petition for 
Certiorari, it is not to argue the merits of the proposed 
appeal. Rather, the purpose is to provide the Court 
information as to why the Certiorari Petition should be 
granted. DRGW accordingly has 1 imited the scope of the 
argument in this Brief and Alternative Cross-Petition. 
Relying on Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Mr. Gleave wants this Court to grant his Certiorari 
Petition on the punitive damages question. Petition for 
Certiorari at 13. Mr. Gleave claims that the Court of Appeals 
rendered a decision on the punitive damages question "that has 
so far departed from the accepted course of judicial 
proceedings . . . as to call for the exercise of this Court's 
power of supervision . . . .ff Nothing in Mr. Gleavefs 
Certiorari Petition supports that strong contention. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that, "Before punitive 
damages may be awarded, the plaintiff must prove conduct that 
is willful and malicious or that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of 
others." 749 P.2d at 670 (citations omitted). Although DRGW 
thinks that the malice-in-law/reckless punitive damage standard 
may not apply to this case, the Court of Appeals gave Mr. 
Gleave the benefit of the doubt and applied that generous 
standard instead of the more demanding malice in fact/willful 
standard. Significantly, whatever DRGW might think about the 
standard, Mr. Gleave does not contend that the Court of Appeals 
adopted the wrong legal standard for awarding punitive damages. 
In reviewing the directed verdict in favor of DRGW, 
the Court of Appeals applied the standard of review most 
favorable to Mr. Gleave. That is, the Court viewed all of the 
evidence in the record in a light most favorable to Mr. 
Gleave. Having done that, the Court concluded that, at most, 
the evidence supported a reasonable jury conclusion that DRGW 
had been negligent. "But," the Court explained, "evidence of 
simple negligence alone does not support an award of punitive 
damages." 749 P.2d at 670. 
-10-
Mr. Gleave does not take issue with the Court of 
Appeal's legal standard for awarding punitive damages, nor does 
Mr. Gleave take issue with the standard of review used by the 
Court of Appeals in affirming the directed verdict. He just 
dislikes the result. Stripped to its essentials, Mr. Gleavefs 
Petition for Certiorari amounts to nothing more than a bad 
faith request that the Supreme Court duplicate the thorough job 
of appellate review that has already been done by the Court of 
Appeals. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
provides: "Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only 
when there are special and important reasons therefore.'1 Mr. 
Gleave has failed to provide the Supreme Court even one good 
reason to justify granting his Certiorari Petition. 
Mr. Gleave's Petition for Certiorari is written as if 
it were a Brief on the merits. At pages 2-13 of his Petition 
for Certiorari, Mr. Gleave indulges in broad-brush arguments 
concerning selected evidence, including evidence that is not 
even in the trial record. The evidence argued by Mr. Gleave 
that is not in the record pertains to alleged "near misses" 
(perhaps a better term would be "non-accidents"). The Court of 
Appeals notes: "Mr. Gleavefs attorney claimed he would offer 
evidence at trial of 'near misses' at the crossing, but none 
was produced." 749 P.2d at 671. 
DRGW concedes that Mr. Gleave at trial did offer 
evidence of alleged near misses, and that the trial court 
excluded that evidence. Mr. Gleave made a proffer of the 
excluded evidence. However, after judgment was entered and 
DRGW appealed and Mr. Gleave cross-appealed, Mr. Gleave did not 
raise as a cross-appeal issue the exclusion of the so-called 
near-miss evidence. Since Mr. Gleave did not appeal from the 
exclusion of the near-miss evidence, the Court of Appeals did 
not receive Briefs or hear oral arguments bearing on the 
propriety of excluding the proffered near-miss evidence. Mr. 
Gleave has waived his right to appeal from the exclusion of the 
near-miss evidence. Ignoring his own waiver, Mr. Gleave now 
wants to argue that punitive damages should be awarded based on 
evidence which is not in the record and which is not involved 
in any issue on appeal. 
Mr. Gleave also makes much of the fact that a certain 
aerial photograph marked Exhibit 8 at trial was not transmitted 
to the Court of Appeals by the District Court. Exhibit 8 is an 
unusually large exhibit, approximately 3 1/2 feet by 3 1/2 feet 
square. As Mr. Gleavefs lawyer well knows, it is not customary 
for the Clerk of a District Court to transmit unusually large 
exhibits to an appellate court unless special arrangements are 
made by counsel for transmittal of the oversized exhibits. Mr. 
Gleave failed to comply with Rule 12(b)(3) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals which provides: "Exhibits of unusual bulk 
or weight other than documents shall not be transmitted by the 
clerk unless directed to do so by a party or by the Clerk of 
the Court of Appeals. A party must make advance arrangments 
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with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of exhibits 
of unusual bulk or weight/1 Id. (emphasis added). 
But even if we can assume that Mr. Gleave was not at 
fault in connection with Exhibit 8, the most Mr. Gleave can 
demonstrate is harmless error. It is absurd for Mr. Gleave to 
contend, as he apparently does contend, that the Court of 
Appeals would have reached a different result on punitive 
damages in this case if it had looked at the aerial 
photograph. Not only did the Court of Appeals have the 
opportunity to review several hundred pages of trial testimony, 
it also had the benefit of numerous smaller photographic 
exhibits, including a video tape of the subject crossing played 
by Mr. Gleave's lawyer at oral arguments before the Court of 
Appeals. 
Mr. Gleave claims that Exhibit 8 somehow irrefutably 
"proves" that the location of the subject crossing was less 
rural than the Court of Appeals thought it to be. In fact, the 
aerial photograph was cumulative evidence that added nothing 
new to all of the other evidence adduced at trial concerning 
the particular details about the subject crossing. The 
photograph changes nothing. No evidence in the record, 
including the large aerial photograph marked Exhibit 8 at 
trial, is inconsistent with the findings by the Court of 
Appeals that "locality was rural and the road not heavily 
traveled." 749 P.2d at 671. If the location is not rural, 
perhaps Mr. Gleave can explain the undisputed presence of a 
large tin barn at the southwest corner of the crossing. 
Besides, the ultimate issue on punitive damages does 
not turn on whether the crossing was in a very rural area or in 
a slightly developing rural area. The ultimate issue is 
whether DRGW's conduct went beyond negligence to satisfy the 
legal standard for punitive damages. In affirming the directed 
verdict on punitive damages, the Court of Appeals followed "the 
general rule" which provides "that only compensatory damages 
are appropriate and that punitive damages may be awarded only 
in exceptional cases." 749 P.2d at 671 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). 
No public objective would be advanced by granting Mr. 
Gleave's Petition for Certiorari. First5 it would be bad 
policy to introduce punitive damages into a case where the 
evidence shows negligence at most. Second, as a matter of law, 
the Court can take judicial notice that DRGW is subject to 
ongoing administrative regulation by the Utah Public Service 
Commission, UDOT, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the 
Federal Railroad Administration. Moreover, as the Court of 
Appeals correctly held in this case, under applicable Utah 
statutes, "The government alone must consistently regulate 
safety devices at railroad crossings, determine which devices 
at which crossings should be recommended for federal funding, 
rank crossings in order of need for upgrading in light of 
limited funds for that purpose, and apportion signal 
installation costs between public and private entities. As a 
practical matter, the private sector cannot perform those 
functions." 749 P.2d at 667-68. 
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The uncontroverted evidence in the record in this case 
is that all crossings throughout the State of Utah are 
systematically evaluated and upgraded by UDOT as federal monies 
become available. The appropriate state and federal agencies 
are acutely aware of the risks to operators of motor vehicles 
at railroad crossings. Every year millions of dollars are 
appropriated by the appropriate agencies for purposes of 
inspecting and, to the extent funds are available, upgrading 
safety at particular crossings. 
II. 
DRGW'S ALTERNATIVE CROSS-PETITION SHOULD BE 
GRANTED IF THE COURT GRANTS MR. GLEAVEfS PETITION: 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MR. GLEAVE COULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN ENTIRELY WITHOUT FAULT 
If this Court grants Mr. Gleave?s Petition, then DRGW 
alternatively cross-petitions on an important issue of state 
right-of-way law. DRGWTs Alternative Cross-Petition seeks an 
ultimate ruling by this Court that the verdict must be set 
aside because Mr. Gleave had to have been at least 1% negligent 
as a matter of the undisputed evidence and applicable 
right-of-way law. The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to 
hold that a motorist in Utah is at least 1% negligent as a 
matter of law if he admits to driving out in front of a train, 
at a crossing marked with a stop sign, without first looking 
both ways and particularly in the direction of greatest visual 
obstruction. 
For purposes of this Alternative Cross-Petition for 
Certiorari, DRGW is not asking the Supreme Court to completely 
rehear every contention raised before the Court of Appeals by 
DRGW. DRGW may disagree with some of the ultimate legal 
conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in this case, but 
DRGW is only seeking further review of one of those legal 
conclusions. At this level of review, DRGW only seeks a 
holding by this Court that Section II of the opinion issued in 
this case by the Court of Appeals, 749 P.2d at 664-66, is wrong. 
A. MR GLEAVE WAS AT LEAST 1% NEGLIGENT BECAUSE 
HE VIOLATED HIS ABSOLUTE DUTY TO YIELD THE 
RIGHT OF WAY TO THE TRAIN 
Both as a matter of Utah statutory and common law, 
DRGW absolutely and unquestionably enjoyed a superior right of 
way at the crossing where Mr. Gleave caused the accident. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-72.10, 41-6-95, 41-6-97, 41-6-99 (1953, 
as amended) (reproduced at Appendix Exhibit D). DRGW had the 
right of way because it is a train and because the crossing had 
a stop sign for motorists like Mr. Gleave. By violating DRGW's 
superior right of way, the jury was obligated to find, but did 
not find, that Mr. Gleave was at least 1% negligent. To find 
Mr. Gleave entirely without fault, as the jury did, the jury 
had to have completely ignored the lower court's instructions 
concerning an autoist?s absolute and non-waivable duty at a 
stop sign to yield the right of way to an oncoming train. 
DRGW respectfully petitions the Supreme Court to 
decide this fundamental question of right-of-way law. The 
decision on Mr. Gleavefs negligence rendered by the Court of 
Appeals in this case is inconsistent with, cannot be squared 
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with, and is not supported by the numerous Utah Supreme Court 
railroad crossing cases and statutes. The cited cases and 
statutes establish the minimum legal standard for "reasonable" 
conduct of motorists approaching railroad crossings in Utah, 
Mr. Gleave fell below the minimum standard of care. The 
opinion issued by the Court of Appeals does not directly or 
correctly analyze the many cases and statutes which compel a 
finding that Mr. Gleave was at least 1% negligent as a matter 
of law. 
B. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT MR. GLEAVE 
DIDNfT LOOK BOTH WAYS BEFORE CROSSING THE 
TRACKS 
The opinion released by the Court of Appeals in this 
case does not explain how Mr. Gleave can be found entirely 
without any fault under circumstances where he admitted that 
he pulled out in front of the train while looking to his right, 
knowing all along that the real area of visual obstruction and 
danger was to his left. DRGW submits that it was plain error 
for the Court of Appeals to sustain the jury verdict finding 0% 
fault under these facts. 
Even though Mr. Gleave had actual and present 
knowledge that he was about to drive across railroad tracks, he 
admitted that he proceeded across the tracks looking to his 
right (south) and that he continued looking to the right as he 
started up from the stop sign toward the tracks (R. 1750). He 
admitted that he knew his view to the left (north) was more 
restricted that his view to the right (south). He said that 
from the stop sign he could see about 900 feet down the tracks 
to his right (south) but only 50 to 100 feet up the tracks to 
his left (north) (R. 1758-59). Nevertheless, while still 
looking right, he testified that he traveled from the stop sign 
to a point where he could no longer stop and avoid the 
collision. (R. 1759-60). Mr. Gleave admitted that only after 
it was too late to prevent the accident that he finally 
"glanced back to the left" and saw the train (R. 1750). 
Under all the circumstances, the uncontested evidence 
is that Mr. Gleave proceeded across the tracks with his eyes 
foolishly glued to his right for an inordinately and 
dangerously long period of time, even though he knew the area 
to his left was the most obstructed and thus the area of 
greatest potential danger. 
The uncontroverted evidence shows that Mr. Gleave 
proceeded across the tracks into the path of the train without 
first looking both ways, causing at least 1% of his accident. 
A new trial is necessary to allow a jury to quantify the amount 
of Mr. Gleavefs negligence compared to the negligence, if any, 
attributable to DRGW. 
III. 
RULE 33 SANCTIONS AGAINST MR. GLEAVE ARE 
APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
With respect to DRGW's request for sanctions against 
Mr. Gleave, in the interests of brevity, DRGW invites the 
attention of the Court to Appendix Exhibit E and Appendix 
Exhibit F. 
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Appendix Exhibit E is a copy of Rule 33 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court, including the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 33. The Advisory Committee Note makes clear that 
the imposition of sanctions is mandatory if the Court finds 
that an appeal was frivolous or filed for delay. 
Appendix Exhibit F is a copy of a letter dated March 
30, 1988 from DRGW's counsel to Mr. Gleavefs counsel. That 
letter put Mr. Gleave on notice that DRGW would seek sanctions 
for bad faith delay and it confirms the $625,868.81 
unconditional offer of settlement made by DRGW to Mr. Gleave 
February 23, 1988. Appendix Exhibit F is self-explanatory. 
DRGW made its unconditional offer the day after the Court of 
Appeals denied Mr. Gleavefs and DRGW's respective rehearing 
petitions. 
As set forth in the letter and in this Brief and 
Alternative Cross-Petition, Mr. Gleave's stubborn refusal to 
drop his punitive damage claim is not in good faith. Both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals adopted the forgiving 
legal standard for punitive damages favored by Mr. Gleave, and 
both lower courts reviewed all the evidence on punitive damages 
in a light most favorable to him before granting DRGW's Motion 
For Directed Verdict. 
Under all the circumstances, DRGW requests relief from 
the Supreme Court for Mr. Gleave's bad faith. Specifically, 
DRGW seeks an order that DRGW does not have to pay any 
post-judgment interest to Mr. Gleave from and after the 
unconditional offer of settlement made to Mr. Gleave February 
23, 1988. Additionally, DRGW seeks an award of double costs 
and attorney's fees in connection with resisting Mr. Gleave 
from and after February 23, 1988. If requested by the Court, 
DRGW will submit an affidavit on attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, DRGW urges this Court to 
deny Mr. Gleavefs Petition for Certiorari. This Court should 
also grant DRGW's Motion to impose Rule 33 sanctions on Mr. 
Gleave for a bad faith appeal. In the alternative, if this 
Court grants Mr. Gleavefs Petition, DRGW respectfully requests 
that this Court also grant DRGWfs Cross-Petition for Certiorari. 
DATED this 6? ~ day of June, 1988. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
By \ d ^ S Q\hv^^ 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents The Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company and Utah Railway Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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We affirm, but remand for the purpose 
of taking additional evidence of the value 
of the fifty-foot strip and for entry of judg-
ment accordingly. No costs awarded. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., and 
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
Robert L. GLEAVE, Plaintiff and 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, 
and Utah Railway Company, a corpora-
tion, Defendants and Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents, 
and 
State of Utah, Department of 
Transportation, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Nos. 86J)057-CA^860058-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 28, 1988. 
Rehearing and Reconsideration 
Denied Feb. 22, 1988. 
Motorist brought action against rail-
road company and State Department of 
Transportation for injuries sustained in col-
lision with train. The Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, Cullen Y. Christensen, 
J., dismissed Department from case and 
after trial entered judgment for motorist 
and appeal was taken. The Court of Ap-
peals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) statute 
giving State Department of Transportation 
ultimate responsibility for railroad crossing 
design and warning and safety devices did 
not relieve railroad of its duty to operate 
trains with reasonable care and maintain 
its right-of-way; (2) evidence was sufficient 
to support finding that railroad breached 
its duty of reasonable care to motorist and 
that motorist was not contributorily negli-
gent; and (3) installation, maintenance and 
improvements of safety signals or devices 
at railroad crossing was governmental 
function immune from suit under state 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Affirmed. 
1. Railroads <s=>310 
Statute giving State Department of 
Transportation ultimate responsibility for 
crossing design and warning and safety 
devices at railroad crossing did not relieve 
railroad company of duty to operate trains 
with reasonable care, nor did it prohibit 
railroad from exercising reasonable care in 
operation of its trains^and maintenance of 
its right-of-way. U.C.A.1953, 54-4-15(2, 4), 
54-4-15.1. 
2. Railroads <s=>348(5) 
Expert testimony that due to crossing 
angle, mound of earth, vegetation and 
curving railroad track, driver proceeding 
east on road could see only 285 feet of 
track to north when stopped at existing 
stop sign at railroad crossing, that train 
that hit motorist's car was traveling at 50 
miles per hour, the speed set by railroad, 
and that driver with front end of his car 
even with stop sign could not see train 
moving at 50 miles per hour until it was 
four seconds away from crossing was suffi-
cient to support finding that railroad com-
pany breached its duty of reasonable care 
and was negligent toward motorist struck 
by train, notwithstanding fact that railroad 
did install stop sign to supplement yellow 
railroad crossing sign and X-shaped cross-
buck. 
3. Railroads «=>348(8) 
Evidence was sufficient to support 
finding that motorist exercised reasonable 
care at railroad crossing by stopping ve-
hicle at established stop sign and looking 
for train and yet failed to see oncoming 
train until it was too late to avoid collision, 
and thus motorist was not contributorily 
negligent in collision; motorist was not re-
quired to inch his car forward past estab-
CLEAVE v. DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN R 
Cite at 749 P~2d 660 (Utah App. 1988) 
lished stop sign to stop second time in 10. Railroads <s==349 
narrow and precarious zone which afforded 
no greater degree of safety when train 
approaching at 50 miles per hour was close 
but still out of view. 
Utah 661 
4. States e=> 112.2(2) 
State Department of Transportation's 
regulation of public safety needs and evalu-
ation, installation, maintenance and im-
provement of safety signals and devices at 
railroad crossings was governmental func-
tion immune from suit under state Govern-
mental Immunity Act. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-
3. 
5. States <3=>U2.2(2) 
State Department of Transportation's 
failure to install different safety signals or 
devices at railroad crossing was purely dis-
cretionary function within meaning of dis-
cretionary function exception to waiver of 
immunity under state Governmental Immu-
nity Act. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10<lKa). 
6. Damages <3=*208(8) 
If there is no evidence to justify puni-
tive damages, issue is properly withheld 
from jury, but if reasonable inferences sup-
porting judgment for losing party could be 
drawn from evidence presented at trial, 
directed verdict as to punitive damages 
cannot be sustained, even if reasonable per-
sons might reach different conclusions on 
punitive damage issue after considering ev-
idence and reasonable inferences there-
from. 
7. Damages e=>91(l) 
Before punitive damages may be 
awarded, plaintiff must prove conduct that 
is willful and malicious or that manifests 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of, rights of others. 
8. Damages <s=>91(3) 
Evidence of simple negligence alone 
does not support award of punitive dam-
ages. 
9. Damages <S=>87(1) 
General rule is that only compensatory 
damages are appropriate and punitive dam-
ages may be awarded only in exceptional 
Railroad's failure to take corrective 
steps to remedy dangerous conditions at 
railroad crossing, which resulted in motor-
ist sustaining serious injuries when struck 
by train, was result of simple negligence, 
and not result of either actual or implied 
malice, and thus motorist was not entitled 
to punitive damages. 
11. Statutes <S=>181(1), 212.6 
In construing legislation Court of Ap-
peals must give effect to legislature's un-
derlying intent, and assume that each term 
in statute was used advisedly. 
12. Statutes <3=>189 
Court of Appeals will interpret and 
apply statute according to its literal word-
ing unless it is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable. 
13. Statutes <s=»184 
Proper construction of statute's terms 
must further statute's purpose. 
14. Interest <s=*39(2.5) 
Statute providing for prejudgment in-
terest limited special damages on which 
prejudgment interest was recoverable to 
those that arose in period between act giv-
ing rise to cause of action and entry of 
judgment in plaintiff's favor, and did not 
allow prejudgment interest on all types of 
special damages such as those that would 
arise subsequent to entry of judgment. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-44. 
Robert J. Debry (argued), Robert J. De-
bry & Associates, Salt Lake City, for Rob-
ert L. Gleave. 
E. Scott Savage (argued), Patrick J. 
O'Hara, Michael F. Richman, Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake 
City, for Denver & Rio Grande Western R. 
Co. 
William Bannon (argued), Paul Warner, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
UDOT. 
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Before JACKSON, BENCH and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This action arises from a collision be-
tween an eastbound motor vehicle driven 
by Robert L. Gleave and an empty south-
bound coal train operated by an agent of 
the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company. The accident occurred at day-
light on April 16, 1982, at the crossing of 
1600 South Street in Springville, Utah, and 
the railroad tracks. Gleave suffered se-
vere personal injuries, and his vehicle was 
demolished. He filed this personal injury 
action, and a jury awarded him damages of 
$425,140.00 against the defendants Denver 
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
and Utah Railway Company, which we will 
refer to collectively as Rio Grande. The 
jury did not attribute any negligence to 
Gleave. Before trial, the Utah Department 
of Transportation ("UDOT") was dismissed 
from the case on sovereign immunity 
grounds. 
Rio Grande's appeal presents three sub-
stantial issues:! (1) was Rio Grande re-
lieved of its duty to Gleave because regula-
tion and control of safety signals and de-
vices at railroad-highway crossings is the 
state's "exclusive" preempted domain? (2) 
was Gleave negligent as a matter of law? 
and (3) did the trial court err when it dis-
missed UDOT on grounds of sovereign im-
munity? Gleave has cross-appealed on two 
points: (4) did the trial court erroneously 
1. Rio Grande also claimed it was entitled to 
have the jury instructed that it could reduce 
Gleave's damages if it found that he failed to 
mitigate his damages by not wearing a seat belt. 
That issue was recently resolved adversely to 
Rio Grande's position in Hillier v. hitnborn, 740 
l\2d 300, 303-04 (Utah App.1987). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2) and (4) (1986) 
provide: 
(2) The department shall have the power to 
determine and prescribe the manner, includ-
ing the particular point of crossing, and the 
terms of installation, operation, maintenance, 
use and protection . . . of each crossing of a 
public road or highway by a railroad or street 
railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice 
versa, and to alter or abolish any such cross-
ing, to restrict the use of such crossings to 
grant Rio Grande's motion for a directed 
verdict on Gleave's claim for punitive dam-
ages? and (5) did the trial court err in 
denying prejudgment interest on Gleave's 
award of damages for lost future earnings 
and earning capacity? 
We affirm the judgment. 
I. DUTY OF RAILROAD COMPANY 
Rio Grande argues that "the joint juris-
diction of these state agencies [i.e., UDOT 
and its reviewing agency, the Utah Public 
Service Commission] over the signs and 
control devices at railroad crossings re-
mains exclusive and a private party, such 
as a railroad, has no more right to change 
the traffic protection signs at a public rail-
road crossing, than it would to change any 
other signs on a public highway." Rio 
Grande's "exclusivity" conclusion is based 
on its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 54-4-15(2), (4) and 54-4-15.1 (1986).2 In 
other words, Rio Grande claims it does not 
have any duty to the public because the 
duty has been preempted by the state. 
Gleave argues that it makes no difference 
who had the duty to install signs and sig-
nals at the collision crossing because that 
issue was not presented to the jury and 
because the jury decided that Rio Grande 
breached duties other than a duty to install 
better signs or control devices. 
[11 Rio Grande's attempt to hide behind 
the statutes motivates us to seek further. 
Does not our law impose a basic duty of 
reasonable care and prudence upon Rio 
Grande, regardless of any statutory duty? 
certain types of traffic in the interest of public 
safety.. .. 
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive 
jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute 
upon petition by any person aggrieved by anv 
action of the department pursuant to this sec 
tion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1986) provides: 
The Department of Transportation so as to 
promote the public safety shall as prescribed 
in this act provide lor the installing, maintain-
ing, reconstructing, and improving of auto 
malic and other safety appliances, signals or 
devices at grade crossings on public highways 
or roads over the tracks of any railroad or 
street railroad corporation in the state. 
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landmark cas£ of argued that the railroad company was neg 
ligent because the crossing was "more than 
ordinarily hazardous" and the company 
knew it but failed to install adequate sig 
nals to warn the public of danger Appar 
ently intrigued by that argument, the 
Bridges court cited English, adopted the 
commentary, and expanded the holding 
To authorize a jury to find negligence 
on the part of the railroad in not taking 
additional precautions there must be evi 
dence to indicate that the crossing was 
more than ordinarily hazardous, 1 e, 
there must be something in the configu 
ration of the land, or in the construction 
of the railroad, or in the structures in the 
vicinity, or in the nature or amount of 
the travel on the highway, or in other 
conditions, which renders the warning 
employed at the crossings inadequate to 
warn the public of danger 
Id at 283, 488 P 2d at 739 In a recent per 
curiam decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court, this "language from Bridget) was 
quoted Hobbs v Denver & Rio Grande 
W RR, 677 P2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1984) 
Thus, the "more than ordinarily hazard 
ous" doctrine rode the legal rails into rail 
road crossing negligence law in Utah, and 
we are required to apply that doctrine at 
this time3 
We believe Gleave more accurately de 
scribes what happened at trial The jury 
was specifically instructed that UDOT was 
statutorily given ultimate responsibility for 
crossing design and warning and safety 
devices and that, accordingly, it could not 
find Rio Grande negligent "based upon any 
defects which might exist with respect to 
the design of the 1600 South crossing or 
based upon any problems you may perceive 
in the lack of traffic warning devices 
We think so In the 
English v Southern Pac Co, 13 Utah 407, 
45 P 47 (1896), the railway company 
pressed the same argument The statute 
in question imposed upon railway compa 
nies the duty of ringing bells and sounding 
whistles when trains approached public 
crossings The railroad argued that timely 
operation of bells and whistles was suffi-
cient and "no additional duty was imposed 
under any circumstances, [sic] to present 
injury " Id at 416, 45 P at 49 Enroute 
to adopting the general rule in English, the 
supreme court observed 
[I]n some cases it has been held that 
before a jury will be warranted in say-
ing, in the absence of any statutory di-
rection to that effect, that a railroad 
company should keep a flagman or gates 
at a crossing, it must be shown that such 
crossing is more than ordinarily hazard-
ous 
Id at 419, 45 P at 50 But the court ended 
\te fcratym v a l v a l fcTT&ratYftg \ta£ "rtwre 
than ordinarily hazardous" idea and held 
instead that the reasonable care and pru-
dence to be used must depend upon the 
facts of each case 
[Wjhile the statutes of Utah make some 
provision for the safety of the public 
while crossing tracks when crossing over 
the public thoroughfares , yet these 
statutes will not relieve the railroad com 
pany from adopting such other reason-
able measures for the public safety as 
common prudence may dictate, consid-
ering the danger, locality, travel, and 
surrounding circumstances of the case 
Id at 420, 45 P at 50 (emphasis added) 
In Bridges v Union Pac R R Co, 26 
Utah 2d 281, 488 P 2d 738 (1971), plaintiffs 
focused on the English commentary and 
. Although this doctrine is unnecessary and con 
fusing, it makes tio difference iti the present 
case See the unpublished opinion of U S Dis 
tnct Judge Bruce A Jenkins in Wilde v Denver 
& Rio Grande WRR Co, No C-83-149J, slip 
op at 16 (DUt April 3 1985) [Available on 
WESTLAW 1985 WL 17370) 
In conclusion the court would be remiss if 
it did not express its criticism of the doctrine 
of the more than ordinarily hazardous' 
crossing The Utah Supreme Court should, at 
its first opportunity examine the doctrine 
with an eye to eliminating it The court be 
lieves that instructing a fact finder that it 
cannot find a railroad negligent for operating, 
a train through a crossing without taking ad 
ditional precautions unless it first finds that 
the warnings at the crossing were inadequate 
to warn the public adds nothing—except per 
haps confusion—to an instruction that the 
railroad has a duty to operate its trains with 
reasonable care If the warnings are ade 
quate, a jury would find that a reasonable 
person would not add additional warnings A 
special doctrine is not necessary 
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there. The jury proceeded to find that the 
crossing in this case was "more than ordi-
narily hazardous." Once past that thresh-
old, the jury was obligated to decide wheth-
er Rio Grande exercised reasonable care in 
driving the train across this roadway, given 
the crossing's design, its physical charac-
teristics, and the existing warning signs.4 
The statute relied upon by Rio Grande 
does not relieve it of the duty to operate 
trains with reasonable care, nor does it 
prohibit Rio Grande from exercising rea-
sonable care in the operation of its trains 
and the maintenance of its right-of-way. 
Rio Grande cannot ignore the public peril 
at a more than ordinarily hazardous cross-
ing and excuse itself until UDOT takes 
action to upgrade the safety devices at the 
1600 South crossing. Rio Grande remains 
subject to a standard of reasonable care 
which, under the circumstances at this 
crossing, could require actions to reduce 
the risks imposed on the public. 
(2] Two experts testified that condi-
tions at this crossing made it extraordinari-
ly dangerous. Due to the crossing angle, a 
mound of earth, vegetation, and a curving 
track, a driver proceeding east on the road 
could see only 285' of track to the north 
when stopped at the existing stop sign. 
Rio Grande admitted be&we trial that the 
train that hit Gleave's car was travelling at 
50 mph, the speed limit set by the railroad. 
A driver with the front end of his car even 
with the stop sign could not see a train 
moving at 50 mph (approximately 74' per 
second) until it was 4 seconds away from 
the crossing. Moreover, an audiologist tes-
tified that a train whistle would not warn a 
motorist until about 3 seconds before the 
train crossed the road. The whistle sound 
would be absorbed by the mound of earth 
and vegetation in the curvature of the 
track. 
Rio Grande did install a stop sign to 
supplement the round yellow railroad 
4. iRJighls and duties of a traveler and of" a 
railroad company ai crossings are mutual and 
reciprocal. . [A) railroad company, merely 
because it is the favored traffic, [may not) 
carelessly and heedlessly operate its trains 
over crossings at an unusual and excessive 
speed and without giving adequate warnings. 
crossing sign and the X-shaped crossbuck. 
But Rio Grande did not introduce evidence 
of other affirmative action to reduce the 
risks at this crossing, such as straightening 
the track, lowering the dirt mound, remov-
ing obstructive vegetation, or lowering 
train speed. The jury' could thus reason-
ably find that Rio Grande breached its duty 
of reasonable care and was, therefore, neg-
ligent toward Gleave. 
II. EVIDENCE OF GLEAVE'S LACK 
OF NEGLIGENCE 
. [3] In its special verdict, the jury specif-
ically found no negligence on the part of 
Gleave. Rio Grande filed a motion for a 
new trial under Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(6), 
claiming that the evidence was insufficient 
to support this part of the verdict. 
On appeal, the trial court's denial of Rio 
Grande's motion must be sustained if there 
is an evidentiary basis for the jury's deci-
sion. Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1982). Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, we will 
reverse the court's ruling only if "the evi-
dence to support the verdict was complete-
ly lacking or was so slight and unconvinc-
ing as to make the verdict plainly unrea-
sonable and unjust." Id. (quoting 
McCloud v. Bau?n, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 
(Utah 1977)). 
Gleave testified that he pulled up to the 
stop sign and stopped his vehicle. He then 
looked to the left (north) and saw a dirt 
mound with weeds on it and 50-100' of 
track but no train approaching; then he 
looked to the right (south), where he saw 
no train in his unobstructed view three 
hundred yards down the track. Making his 
decision to proceed while still looking 
southward, he began moving his vehicle 
forward slowly and glanced back to the 
left, seeing the train rapidly bearing down 
on him and hearing its whistle for the first 
or create a misleading set of circumstances 
and rely upon the assumption that the travel-
ing public may look out for their safety and 
keep out of the way of the trains. 
Toomer's hlstate v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 
37, 58-59, 239 P.2d 163, 173 (1951). 
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time. At that point in time, which Gleave 
estimated was 2-3 seconds before impact, 
Gleave testified his car was 3-4' from the 
track. Deciding he could not cross the 
tracks safely in light of the train's speed, 
Gleave braked. But by the time thtj car 
stopped, it was approximately 1' from the 
track. Although he then tried to put the 
car in reverse, he was hit by the train 
before he succeeded in shifting gears be-
cause the train engine overhangs the track 
by considerably more than twelve inches. 
Van Wagoner, an engineer who evalu-
ates railroad crossing designs, testified 
that the one at 1600 South in Springville is 
the worst out of thousands of crossings he 
had seen that were controlled with stop 
signs. According to Van Wagoner, the 
stop sign creates an expectancy in drivers 
that, if they stop there, they will have 
sufficient visibility of any hazard to allow 
them to make a decision about proceeding 
and sufficient time to then proceed and 
clear the hazard. That expectancy is not 
met at the subject crossing because a driv-
er stopped at the stop sign, who does not 
know the train's actual speed, can only see 
285' up the track to the north. If the 
driver sees no train coming from that di-
rection, the decision is made to proceed 
while continuing to be watchful for ap-
proaching trains. However, it takes a few 
seconds to react and make this decision, a 
few more for the car to accelerate, and a 
few more to move the car over the tracks 
a^d completely out of danger. According 
to Van Wagoner, this process takes 9.1 
seconds from the stop sign, based on condi-
tions at this crossing. Such a driver is 100 
percent certain to be hit by a train moving 
at 50 mph (approximately 74' per second) if 
the train is fewer than 670' away from the 
crossing when the 9 J second process be-
gins. Even if the driver could cross the 
tracks in only 8 seconds, collision would be 
inevitable if the 50 mph train was any 
closer than 590' away when the process 
began. The driver is trapped because, by 
the time the 50 mph train is visible, there is 
5. We note that Utah law requires a driver ap-
proaching a railroad crossing to stop "within 
fifty feet but not less than ten feet from the 
nearest track of such railroad" when an ap-
not enough time to continue and cross the 
tracks safely or to stop the car, change 
gears, and back up out of the train's path. 
On appeal, Gleave does not deny that he 
had a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
operating his vehicle over the railroad 
crossing; instead, he says the evidence 
shows he carried out that duty. 
The law requires that a traveler, ap-
proaching a railroad crossing, look and 
listen, and, if necessary, stop to avoid 
being injured by trains. This is his duty 
at all times and on all occasions, whether 
his view be obstructed or unobstructed, 
and the greater the hazard or danger 
surrounding him, the greater is the care 
required of him. 
Lundquist v. Kennccott Copper Co., 30 
Utah 2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184 
(1973). Rio Grande argues that Gleave's 
own testimony shows him to be negligent 
as a matter of law because he did not stop 
a second time at a point where he was close 
enough to the track to see further north-
ward, but far enough from the track that a 
passing train would still clear the front end 
of his car. 
A plaintiff is contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law, if all reasonable 
minds would conclude that he failed to 
use the degree of care which an ordinary, 
reasonable, and prudent person would 
have observed for his own safety under 
the circumstances. 
Id. at 266, 516 P.2d at 1185. Based on all 
the evidence in the record, we hold that 
Gleave's conduct was not negligent as a 
matter of law. All reasonable minds would 
not necessarily conclude that Gleave failed 
to exercise reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances he faced. 
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who 
moved his car several feet beyond the stop 
sign and stopped with the front end at a 
spot 10' from the rail could still only see 
northward 285', resulting in no gain in 
sight distance.5 From that spot, the "reac-
tion, decision, acceleration, and clearance" 
proaching train "is plainly visible and is in haz-
ardous proximity to such crossing." Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-95(a)(4) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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process would still take 8.6 seconds, result-
ing inevitably in a collision with an unseen 
50 mph train up to 636' away when the 
process began, as discussed above. 
Gleave's crossing design expert, Mitchell, 
stated it was possible to stop a car beyond 
the stop sign and have a clear view north-
ward 440' up the track, providing approxi-
mately 6 seconds to cross the tracks before 
a train farther away than that could reach 
the crossing. But in this position, "very 
close" to the track, a passing train would 
just miss the front end of the stopped car 
because the train engine is nearly 5' wider 
than the track. 
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who 
stopped with the front of his car 4' from 
the track and then proceeded—upon seeing 
no oncoming train—would still take approx-
imately 7 seconds to react, decide, and 
move across safely, making a collision inev-
itable if a 50 mph train was out of sight but 
fewer than 518' away when the process 
began. 
Rio Grande's accident reconstruction ex-
pert, Limpert, testified that it was physical-
ly possible to stop a car at a safe point only 
7' from the rail, but he did not testify to 
the length of the sight distance northward 
from that point. In his testimony, Limpert 
forcefully ch*llenge<sUthe validity of the 
assumptions and factors used in Van Wag-
oner's calculations, e.g., the maximum 
speed possible given the track's condition 
and the inclusion of decision and reaction 
time in the computations. Limpert also 
provided his expert opinion, illustrated by a 
videotape of a car being driven over the 
crossing from a standstill and from various 
distances away, that the times necessary to 
cross safely were roughly one-third of the 
estimates given by Van Wagoner. How-
ever, it was for the jury to give these 
conflicting opinions whatever weight it 
deemed appropriate. Groen v. Tri-0-Inc.t 
667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983). 
We decline to hold that, as a matter of 
law, all reasonable persons would conclude 
Gleave's duty at this dangerous crossing 
was to inch his car forward past the estab-
lished stop sign to stop a second time in 
this narrow and precarious zone which af-
forded no greater degree of safety when a 
train approaching at 50 mph was close but 
still out of view. Cf. Seybold v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 70-71, 239 P.2d 
174, 179 (1951) (plaintiff either failed to 
look, looked but failed to see what was 
there, or looked and failed to see the on-
coming train because blinded by lights but 
proceeded anyway); Drummond v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., I l l Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903, 
906 (1947) (plaintiff would have had clear 
view of 25-30 mph train if she had stopped 
in a place "which afforded her both safety 
and an opportunity to look"). 
There is substantial evidence on which a 
jury could reasonably base a finding that 
Gleave exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances and yet failed to see the 
oncoming train until it was too late to avoid 
the collision. Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court's denial of Rio Grande's motion 
for a new trial. 
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Gleave alleged in his complaint that 
UDOT breached its statutory duty under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-14 through 15.1 
(1986) to install, maintain and improve safe-
ty signals and devices at the 1600 South 
railroad crossing in Springville. Although 
there was a yellow warning sign, a cross-
buck, and a stop sign at this crossing, he 
claimed that UDOT knew or should have 
known of the unreasonably dangerous con-
dition there and that it negligently failed to 
install "adequate" safety signals or de-
vices. 
The trial court granted UDOT's motion 
to dismiss the complaint based on sover-
eign immunity. In so ruling, the court 
stated that "the decision of whether or not 
to install a safety signal at a particular 
crossing is a discretionary one protected by 
the Governmental Immunity Act," impli-
edly holding that the allegedly negligent 
actions of UDOT constituted a governmen-
tal function protected by the grant of im-
munity in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 
(1986). 
On appeal, Rio Grande makes two argu-
ments challenging this ruling: (1) UDOT's 
regulation of traffic warning devices at 
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railroad crossings is not a "governmental 
function" within the purview of section 63-
80-3 and, therefore, UDOT is not immune 
from suit, and (2) the trial court erroneous-
ly concluded that UDOTs failure to install 
different safety devices at the subject 
crossing fell within the "discretionary func-
tion" exception to the waiver of immunity 
in Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10(1) (1986)6 
A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION 
[4] The Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act ("Act") states that, ' [ejxcept as may 
be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the 
exercise of a governmental function 
Utah Code Ann § 63-30-3 (1986) In 
Standiford v Salt Lake City Corp, 605 
P 2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court abandoned the "governmental versus 
proprietary function" analysis previously 
used in deciding whether an entity was 
immune from suit for injuries resulting 
from a particular activity In doing so, the 
court recognized that the Act does not ex-
pressly or impliedly set up such a dichoto-
my and that the results of the application 
of this analysis had been inconsistent and 
unpredictable See id at 1232-35 The 
court articulated a new test and redefined 
a governmental function as an activity "of 
such a unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency or 
that it is essential to the core of govern-
mental activity " Id at 1237 Under the 
new test, the Standiford court concluded 
6. In his cross appeal, Gleave did not challenge 
the trial court s dismissal of UDOT Rio 
Grande, in both its opposition to UDOTs pre 
trial motion to dismiss and ir its appeal to this 
court, has not contended that Gleave s injury 
was caused by UDOTs creation of a dangerous 
condition on a road, for which immunity is 
expressly waived in Utah Code Ann § 63-30-8 
(1986) This separate waiver provision is not 
subject to the disci etionary function" exception 
in section 63-30-10(1) Sanford \ University of 
Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285 488 P 2d 741, 745 (1971) 
See Richards v Leavttt, 716 P 2d 276, 278 (Utah 
1985) (per curiam), Bigelow v Ingersoll, 618 
P2d 50, 54 n 3 (Utah 1980) 
7. Richards i Ua\itt 716 P 2d 276 (Utah 1985) 
(per curiam) 
the operation of a public gclf course is not 
a governmental function Id 
The next year, in Johnson v Salt Lake 
City Corp, 629 P 2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981), 
the court explained "The first part of the 
Standiford test—activity of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed b\ a 
governmental agencv,—does not refer to 
what government may do, but to what 
government alone rnust do " 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the 
Standiford test numerous times, conclud 
ing that the maintenance of traffic control 
devices,7 supervision of financial institu 
tions,8 the issuance of motor vehicle titles 
and ownership recordkeeping responsibili 
ties,9 and supervision of subdivision de\el 
opment and canal fence construction ,0 are 
governmental functions within the meaning 
of the Act Supervision of disbursement of 
escrowed funds,n the provision of winter 
recreational areas on a public golf course,12 
and the operation of a sewage system n 
have been held not to be governmental 
functions 
UDOT is statutorily empowered to "pro 
vide for the installing, maintaining, recon 
structing, and improving of automatic and 
other safety appliances, signals or devices 
at grade crossings," Utah Code Ann 
§ 54-4-15 1 (1986), and to apportion costs 
of such projects among public and private 
entities Utah Code Ann § 54-4-15 3 
(1986) The government alone must con 
sistently regulate safety devices at railroad 
crossings, determine which devices at 
which crossings should be recommended 
8. Madsen i Borthick, 658 P 2d 627 (Utah 1983) 
9 Metropolitan Fin Co \ State, 714 P 2d 2^3 
(Utah 1986 > (per curiam) 
10. Loveland v Orem Citv Corp, 746 P 2d 763 
(1987) 
11. Cox v Utah Mortg & Loan Co, 716 P 2d 783 
(Utah 1986) 
12. Johnson \ Salt Lake City Corp, 629 P 2d 432 
(Utah 1981) 
13 Dalton \ Salt Lake Sub San Dtst, 676 P 2d 
399 (Utah 1984) Thomas v Clearfield Cm 642 
P2d 737 (Utah 1982) 
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for federal funding, rank crossings in order 
of need for upgrading in light of limited 
funds for that purpose, and apportion sig-
nal installation costs between public and 
private entities. As a practical matter, the 
private sector cannot perform these func-
tions. Accordingly, we hold that the regu-
lation of public safety needs and the evalu-
ation, installation, maintenance and im-
provement of safety signals or devices at 
railroad crossings is a governmental func-
tion immunized from suit under section 63-
30-3 of the Act. 
B. DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION EXCEPTION 
[5] In light of this holding, we must 
next determine whether UDOT's allegedly 
negligent failure to install different safety 
signals at the 1600 South crossing in 
Springville is a "discretionary function" 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(l)(a), an exception to the waiver 
of immunity in that statutory section: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all govern-
mental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omis-
sion of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or per-
formance *0r the faflure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is 
abused[.] 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
this "discretionary function" exception was 
"intended to shield those governmental 
acts and decisions impacting on large num-
bers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable 
ways from individual and class legal ac-
tions, the continual threat of which would 
make public administration all but impossi-
ble." Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 
(Utah 1980). The Frank court noted its 
prior observation, in Carroll v. State Road 
Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 384, 388, 496 P.2d 
888, 891 (1972), that virtually all acts re-
quire the exercise of some degree of discre-
tion and that the statutory exception 
should thus be confined to those decisions 
and acts occurring at the "basic policy-mak-
ing level," and not extended to those acts 
and decisions taking place at the operation-
al level, or, in other words, " . . . those 
which concern routine, everyday matters, 
not requiring evaluation of broad policy 
factors." 
Frank, 613 P.2d at 520. 
More recently, in Little v. Utah State 
Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1983), the court adopted the following test 
for distinguishing between functions at the 
policy-making level from those at the oper-
ational level, requiring affirmative answers 
to four preliminary questions in order for 
an act to be purely discretionary: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic gov-
ernmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, 
or objective as opposed to one which 
would not change the course or direction 
of the policy, program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy evalu-
ation, judgment, and expertise on the 
part of the governmental agency in-
volved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency in-
volved possess the requisite constitution-
al, statutory, or lawful authority and 
duty to do or make the challenged act, 
omission, or decision? 
Id. at 51. 
With regard to the case before us, the 
first question presented by Little must be 
answered affirmatively. The basic govern-
mental objective involved in "installing, 
maintaining, reconstructing, and improv-
ing" safety devices is the consistent pro-
motion of public safety, a basic government 
objective. Evaluating all of the approxi-
mately 1,280 railroad crossings in the state 
and assigning priorities for safety signal 
upgrades is essential to the realization of 
the protection of public safety, especially in 
light of the fact that there are not unlimit-
ed funds available to upgrade all needy 
crossings at once. Thus, the second ques-
tion of the Little test must also be answer-
ed affirmatively. 
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UDOT exercises "basic policy evaluation, 
judgment, and expertise" when evaluating 
railroad crossings for safety signal im-
provements and when deciding which cross-
ings should have upgraded safety appli-
ances first. In applying UDOT's safety 
policy, UDOT's surveillance team performs 
on-site inspections and weighs the numer-
ous factors relating to crossing safety. 
The team consists of transportation experts 
who exercise their collective judgment and 
expertise in making their evaluations of the 
relative dangerousness of railroad cross-
ings in Utah, taking into consideration their 
physical characteristics and configurations, 
the volume and type of vehicular and train 
traffic, and other relevant factors. Thus, 
the third Little question must be answered 
affirmatively. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et 
seq. (1986) empowers UDOT with the au-
thority to supervise and regulate the safety 
of aJl the State's railroad crossings, includ-
ing the authority to provide for the install-
ing, maintaining, reconstructing, and im-
proving of safety devices and signals there. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1986). 
UDOT clearly has the legal authority to 
use the monies available for safety signal 
improvement at the most dangerous cross-
ings first, which means that other less dan-
gerous crossings, such as this one, must 
await their turn for improvement. Thus, 
the answer to the fourth Little question is 
affirmative. 
We therefore hold that UDOTs failure 
to install different safety signals or devices 
at the subject crossing was a purely discre-
tionary function within the meaning of sec-
tion 63-30-10(1 )(a). 
Prior Utah case law supports this conclu-
sion. In Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah 
Public Service Commission's alleged failure 
to require better warning devices at a rail-
road crossing involved the exercise of a 
discretionary function for which immunity 
was not waived. The Velasquez plaintiff, a 
passenger in a pickup truck hit by a train, 
claimed that the state agency was liable for 
failing to require additional safety devices 
at the crossing. Affirming summary judg-
ment in the agency's favor, the court con-
cluded that the statutory- directive to the 
PSC to prescribe the installation of "appro-
priate" safety or other devices by the rail-
road company (under a prior version of 
section 54-4-14) indicated a legislative in-
tent to confer discretion on the responsible 
agency at the time, i.e., the Public Service 
Commission: 
The statute gives the respondent [PSC] 
the power to require a different safety 
device at the crossing in question, but 
that does not mean that the plaintiff 
should recover simply because a better 
warning signal could or should have been 
installed. The Public Service Commis-
sion has the discretion to require the 
installation of such signals as in its judg-
ment the health or safety of employees, 
passengers, customers oir the public may 
require. 
Id. at 218, 469 P.2d at 6. 
We find no merit in Rio Grande's argu-
ment that Velasquez has been overruled by 
Slandiford and Bigclow v. Jngcrsoll, 618 
P.2d 50 (Utah 1980). As previously noted, 
Standiford overruled only those cases ap-
plying the "governmental versus proprie-
tary function" analysis in deciding whether 
or not section 63-30-3 immunity applied to 
the allegedly injurious activity in the first 
place. In Velasquez, the court did not ap-
ply the later discredited mode of analysis; 
instead, it merely assumed there was a 
governmental function and focused solely 
on the applicability of the discretionary 
function exception. Similarly, in Bigclow, 
the court applied the "basic policy-making 
level versus operational level" distinction 
set forth in Frank, discussed above, and 
concluded that the design of the street 
traffic control system did not involve deci-
sions and acts at the basic policy-making 
level and, therefore, was not a discretion-
ary function within section 63-30-10(1). 
Bigelow, 618 P.2d at 53. 
However, as stated above, the allegedly 
negligent omission in this case does involve 
decisions and acts at the basic policy-mak-
ing level. The trial court thus correctly 
concluded that UDOTs failure to install 
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different safety devices or signals at the 
1600 South crossing in Springville comes 
within the discretionary function exception 
of section 63-30-10(l)(si). We therefore af-
firm the dismissal of the complaint against 
UDOT. 
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM 
Gleave alleged that Rio Grande had 
knowledge of dangerous conditions at the 
crossing and "willfully or recklessly failed 
to take any corrective steps." At the close 
of Gleave's evidence, Rio Grande moved for 
a directed verdict on Gleave's punitive dam-
age claim because of insufficiency of the 
evidence. Rio Grande argued that there 
was not one scintilla of evidence of willful 
or malicious activity on its part. Gleave 
agreed there was no proof of actual malice, 
hut argued there was sufficient evidence of 
reckless conduct for the jury to imply mal-
ice. 
The trial court granted Rio Grande's mo-
tion and withdrew the punitive damage is-
sue from the jury's consideration; how-
ever, it is not clear whether that ruling was 
based on inadequate evidence of actual 
malice or implied malice. 
16] In reviewing the correctness of the 
trial court's grant of a directed verdict to 
Rio Grande on Gleave's punitive damage 
claim, we must view the^evidence in the 
light most favorable to him, the party 
against whom the motion was made. Kim 
v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 
1980). If there is no evidence to justify 
punitive damages, the issue was properly 
withheld from the jury. Tripp v. Baglcy, 
75 Uuih 42, 282 P. W26 (1929). Jf, how-
ever, reasonable inferences supporting 
judgment for the losing party could be 
drawn from the evidence presented at trial, 
the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 
P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982); Kim, 610 P.2d 
at 1271. This is so even if reasonable 
14. Wc note that the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 908 (1979) slates: 
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than 
compensatory or nominal damages, awarded 
against a person to punish him for his out-
rageous conduct and to deter him and others 
like him from similar conduct in the future. 
persons might reach different conclusions 
on the punitive damage issue after consid-
ering the evidence and the reasonable in-
ferences therefrom. See Little America 
Refining Co., 641 P.2d at 114. 
[7] Before punitive damages may be 
awarded, the plaintiff must prove conduct 
that is willful and malicious or that mani-
fests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of 
others. Atkin Wright & Miles v. Moun-
tain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 
337 (Utah 1985); Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 
(Utah 1985); Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 
80, 84 (Utah App.1987). 
18] Jn our review of Rio Grande's duty 
of care, we noted substantial evidence from 
which a jury could reasonably conclude 
that Rio Grande was negligent. But evi-
dence of simple negligence alone does not 
support an award of punitive damages. 
Punitive damages should be awarded 
infrequently. Simple negligence will 
never suffice as a basis upon which such 
damages may be awarded. "[They] are 
not awarded for mere inadvertence, mis-
take, errors of judgment and the like, 
which constitute ordinary negligence." 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 
P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (quoting Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment 
b (1979)).u 
In Behrens, the Utah Supreme Court 
identified three elements of the type of 
conduct that will support an award of puni-
tive damages against a defendant in a neg-
ligence action who acts "maliciously or in 
reckless disregard for the rights of oth-
ers." Although actual intent to cause inju-
ry is not necessary, 
the defendant must either know or 
should know "that such conduct would, 
[1] in a high degree of probability, result 
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for 
conduct that is outrageous, because of the 
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indif-
ference to the rights of others . . . 
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in substantial harm to another," Dancu-
tovxch v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 193 
(1979), and [2] the conduct must be 
"highly unreasonable conduct, or an ex-
treme departure from ordinary care, [3] 
in a situation where a high degree of 
danger is apparent" Id. at 191. 
Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186-87 (numbering 
added). 
We now evaluate the evidence presented 
by Gleave in light of these three elements: 
(1) High degree of probability. There 
was uncontroverted testimony that there 
had been no accidents at this crossing up to 
the time of UDOT's inspection and evalua-
tion in 1974. After that time, Rio Grande 
installed stop signs as a temporary mea-
sure until UDOT upgraded the crossing 
with flashing red lights. Gleave's attorney 
claimed he would offer evidence at trial of 
"near misses" at the crossing, but none 
was produced. The locality was rural, and 
the road not heavily travelled. There is no 
evidence that Rio Grande knew or should 
have known of the facts discovered by 
Gleave's experts after this accident. In 
any event, the evidence shows a low degree 
of probability. 
(2) Highly unreasonable conduct or ex-
treme departure from ordinary care. At 
worst, the evidence shows errors of judg-
ment, i.e., ordinary negligence on the part 
of Rio Grande, in failing to take steps to 
reduce the risks at this crossing. There is 
n^evidence of an extreme departure from 
ordinary care. 
(3) High degree of danger apparent. A 
degree of danger exists at every railroad 
crossing. The evidence showed the degree 
of danger at this crossing was high. The 
crossing was more than ordinarily hazard-
ous. But, was the extent of that danger 
readily apparent prior to this accident? 
Perhaps reasonable minds could differ con-
cerning this prong of the Behrens test, but 
the first two prongs remain unsatisfied. 
[9,10] Moreover, the general rule is 
that only compensatory damages are ap-
propriate and that punitive damages may 
be awarded only in exceptional cases. 
Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186. The evidence 
Utah 671 
about Rio shows nothing exceptional 
Grande's conduct in this case. 
Furthermore, punitive damages should 
be awarded only when they will clearly 
accomplish a public objective not accom-
plished by the award of compensatory 
damages.. . . The intended deterrent ef-
fect must be clear and in proportion to 
the nature of the wrong and the possibili-
ty of recurrence. 
Id. at 1187. Gleave has not directed our 
attention to any public objective which 
would clearly be accomplished by an award 
of punitive damages herein. Where the 
wrong is the result of simple negligence, 
there is nothing to deter. We believe the 
substantial compensatory award will pro-
vide ample motivation for Rio Grande to 
take appropriate measures to protect the 
public and itself from a recurrence of this 
unfortunate accident. 
There is no evidence of malice, actual or 
implied, that would justify an award of 
punitive damages against Rio Grande. The 
trial court thus properly withheld that is-
sue from the jury. 
V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
In the special verdict returned in this 
case, the jury awarded Gleave the follow-
ing itemized damages: 
A. Past medical expenses $56,000 
B. Future medical expenses $22,540 
C. Past lost wages $20,000 
D. Loss of future earnings and earn-
ing capacity $275,000 
E. General Damages $50,000 
F. Market value of Gleave vehicle $1,600 
Total $425,140 
The trial court granted Gleave's post-trial 
motion to amend his complaint to include a 
claim for prejudgment interest on items A, 
C, and D, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-^4 (1987). Gleave's request for 
prejudgment interest on items A and C was 
granted, but the court denied prejudgment 
interest on item D. 
It is true, as Gleave asserts, that lost 
future earning capacity is a special damage 
insofar as pleading requirements are con-
cerned. Cohnv.J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 
306, 308 (Utah 1975). But we must still 
decide whether section 78-27-44 authorizes 
prejudgment interest on all types of special 
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damages, whether they arise before or af-
ter entry of a plaintiff's personal injury 
judgment. 
[11-13] In construing this legislation, 
we must give effect to the legislature's 
underlying intent, American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984), and 
assume that each term in the statute was 
used advisedly. West Jordan v. Morrison, 
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). We will 
interpret and apply the statute according to 
its literal wording unless it is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable. Id.; Home v. 
Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App.1987). 
A proper construction of its terms must 
further the statute's purposes. RDG As-
socs./Jorman Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 1987). 
[14] The statute provides: 
In all actions brought to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries sustained by 
any person, resulting from or occasioned 
by the tort of any other person, corpora-
tion, association or partnership, whether 
by negligence or willful intent of that 
other person, corporation, association or 
partnership, and whether that injury 
shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, 
it shall be lawful for the plaintiff in the 
complaint to claim interest on the special 
damages alleged from the date of the 
occur re? fee of the act gimng rise to the 
cause of action and it shall be the duty 
of the court, in entering judgment for 
plaintiff in that action, to add to the 
amount of damages assessed by the ver-
dict of the jury . . . interest on that 
amount calculated at 8'A per annum from 
the date of the occurrence of the act 
giving rise to the cause of action to the 
date of entering the judgment, and to 
include it in that judgment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1987) (empha-
sis added). We agree with Rio Grande that 
this emphasized phrase clearly modifies 
"special damages," limiting those special 
damages on which prejudgment interest is 
recoverable to those that arise in the period 
between the act giving rise to the cause of 
action and entry of judgment in plaintiff's 
favor. 
This interpretation of the statute fur-
thers its purpose, as documented in its 
legislative history. When first introduced 
at the 1975 Legislature by Senator Ren-
strom as Senate Bill 153 and later passed 
by the Senate, the word "special" was not 
in the proposed statute; prejudgment inter-
est was to be awarded a successful plain-
tiff on all "damages alleged from the date 
of the occurrence of the a c t . . . . " Utah 
Senate Tr. of 3rd Reading of S.B. 153, 
February 20, 1975. 
At the bill's second and third reading in 
the House of Representatives, however, 
there was a lengthy discussion of the prob-
lems with such a broad prejudgment inter-
est provision. Utah House of Reps. Tr. of 
2nd and 3rd Reading of S.B. 153, March 
13, 1975. Some legislators voiced their 
concerns about accrual of interest on dam-
ages in a malpractice action where the 
cause of action did not even accrue until 
discovery of the injury, possibly many 
years after the date the injurious act oc-
curred. A similar concern was voiced re-
garding injured minors who waited until 
after reaching majority age before bring-
ing their lawsuits; under the proposed stat-
ute, interest could accrue for many years. 
Others feared the effect such a law would 
have on doctors' malpractice insurance 
rates and on all casualty insurance premi-
ums in the state. 
Toward the end of the House debate. 
Representative Fisher offered an amend-
ment to add the word "special" before the 
word "damages" in the bill, explaining that 
special damages are the expenses paid for 
those who are injured so they can immedi-
ately receive necessary medical and hospi 
tal care. He added that special damages 
are 
those expenses that they have paid out of 
pocket, for which they have used their 
own money and which they will not get 
until the settlement of their action. Get-
ting interest on their out-of-pocket ex-
penses will proinde a total recoupment 
of any expenses that they have had 
from the time of the accident until they 
are paid in full by a recovery at court 
or by settlement. I believe it's a reason-
able and a very logical amendment that 
GLEAVE v. DENVER & 1 
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interest on special damages be endorsed 
by us, and in that form we will pass the 
intent of the bill of paying for all ex-
penses until such time as judgment is 
rendered, and we will not be assessing 
an interest on something that neither of 
the parties know. 
Id. (emphasis added). In its amended form, 
Senate Bill 153 then passed in the House 
by five votes. When the amended bill was 
returned to the Senate later the same day, 
Senator Renstrom made a motion that the 
Senate concur in the House amendment. 
After that motion passed, the amended bill 
passed the Senate with no further discus-
sion. Utah Senate Tr. of Vote on S.B. 
153, March 13, 1975. 
The legislative history and the statutory 
language reveal the legislature's intent to 
distinguish between special damages accru-
ing between the date of the injurious act 
and the entry of judgment (such as medical 
expenses or lost wages) and those (such as 
lost future earnings and future earning 
capacity) that will arise subsequent to en-
O GRANDE WESTERN R. Utah 673 
(UuhApp. 1988) 
try of judgment, and to authorize prejudg-
ment interest only on the former category 
of special damages.15 The trial court thus 
properly denied Gleave prejudgment inter-
est under section 78-27-44 on that portion 
of damages in the special jury verdict des-
ignated as "lost future earnings and earn-
ing capacity.'* 
CONCLUSION 
We have considered the other issues 
raised by Rio Grande and find them merit-
less. The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed. Costs are awarded only to 
UDOT. 
GARFF and BENCH, JJ.(1 concur. 
15. The latter type is, of course, subject to the 
statutory interest rate on judgments in Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1986). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN 
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
GERALD H. BURTON, an 
individual, CITY OF 
SPRINGVILLE, a Municipal 
corporation, and STATE OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
REGARDING PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
Civil No. 62912 
(Judge Cullen Y. Christensen) 
At the close of plaintiff's case (June 18, 1984), 
defendant moved for an order granting a directed verdict 
with respect to the issue of punitive damages. 
For reasons set forth in the record, the directed 
verdict is granted with respect to punitive damages only. 
The issue of compensatory damages is specifically 
reserved for the jury. 
(/-
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SPRINCVILLB CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
NARRATIVE RErutu ™L,E * , 
:AT£ AND TIKI* THIS REPORT 
16APR82 0630hrs . 
TYPE OF REPORT 
T/C 
82-379 
16APR82 0630hrs. I was dipatched to a "possible train vehicle" collision, location 
unk. at the "south end of town1' and "around 700 South." I checked the area of 
700 South and 800 South Main St, and was then directed to the railroad yard on 
400 West. As I checked that location, the actual location was relayed to me as 
1600 South Main st.. Upon arrival I confirmed need for an ambulance with dispatch 
and attended to the driver (injured party). Driver was conscious and seemed 
rational inspite of his injuries. I obtained information as to identity of driver 
and then asked him what had happened. Driver, Robert Gleave, gave me the following 
information: Driver was E/B on 1600 South. He stated that he "slowed down" at 
the stop sign and looked to the south. He did not see any train. He then turned 
to look north. When he did he saw the train "right on top of" him. He said 
that he tried evasive action (stopping and backing) but was unable to avoid 
collision. Driver did not know how he was ejected from the vehicle. Ambulance 
personnel then arrived and attended to Driver. 
1 then contacted the conductor, C.E. Connors, who gave the following information 
to me: The train (owned and operated by Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad) 
uas on an eastbound route (south bound at the point of impact) at approx. 50 
(fifty) miles per hour. As they approached the intersection of 1600 South, they 
observed the vehicle (V-1) pull out too far into the intersection before stopping, 
and into the path of their train. The train was a 33 (thirty three) car diesel 
which was running empty at the time. 
The following measurements were taken at the scene: Width of total roadway 
at intersection with RR tracks—21*5" . Distance from south edge of roadway to 
approx. i>01—7'9". Distance POT to POR—29,0". Distance vch to tracks approx.3'. 
driver was located between the veh. and the tracks. 
SPRINC^ILLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
NARRATIVE REPORT PAfiF * 2 
DATE AND TIKI: THIS REPCPT I H P E or REPORT I 82-379 
J6APR82 0630hrs, 
£ OF  
T/C 
Driver was transported by ambulance to Mountain View Hospital, with multiple 
injuries to torso, head, leg (area of left knee) and left foot. 
Vehicle, a 1975 Chev Monza appeared to be totaled, all windshields and side 
windows, appeared in tact with the exception of the drivers side window which was 
down (probable point of ejection.) 
Unknown at time of report whether the train engineer had activated his 
horn as audible signal as he was approaching the intersection. 
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K X H I B I T D 
41-6-66. Motor Vehicles 
on which the regulations or prohibitions are appli-
cable, im 
Article 8. Turns and Signals on Starting, 
Stopping or Turning 
41-6-66. Taming - Manner • Traffic-control devices. 
41-6-67. Turning around - Where prohibited -
Visibility. 
41-6-69. Moving a veiiick - Safety. 
41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes • Safety • Signals 
- Stopping or sudden decrease in speed • Signal 
Hashing - Where prohibited. 
41-6-70. Signals - Methods. 
41-6-71. Signals - How made. 
41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control 
devices. 
The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as 
follows: 
(1) Right turns: both a right turn and an approach 
for a right turn shall be made as close as practical to 
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. 
(2) Left turns: the operator of a vehicle intending 
to turn left shall approach the turn from the 
extreme left-hand lane for traffic moving in the 
same direction. Whenever practicable, the left turn 
shall be made by turning onto the roadway being 
entered in the extreme left-hand lane for traffic 
moving in the new direction, unless otherwise dire-
cted by an official traffic-control device. 
(3) Two-way left turn lanes: where a special lane 
for making left turns by operators proceeding in 
opposite directions has been indicated by official 
traffic-control devices: 
(a) a left turn may not be made from any other 
lane; and 
(b) a vehicle may not be driven in the lane 
except when preparing for or making a left turn 
from or into the roadway or when preparing for or 
making a U-turn when permitted by law. 
(4) The Department of Transportation and local 
authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause 
official traffic-control devices to be placed and 
require and direct that a different course from that 
specified in this section be traveled by turning veh-
icles. The operator of a vehicle may not turn a 
vehicle other than as directed by those devices. 1987 
41-6-67. Turning around - Where prohibited -
Visibility. 
(1) The operator of any vehicle may not turn the 
vehicle to proceed in the opposite direction unless 
the movement can be made safely and without int-
erfering with other traffic. 
(2) A vehicle may not be turned to proceed in the 
opposite direction on any curve, or upon the appr-
oach to, or near the crest of a grade, if the vehicle is 
not visible at a distance of 500 feet by the operator 
of any other vehicle approaching from either direc-
tion. 1987 
41-6-68. Moving a vehicle - Safety. 
A person may not move a vehicle which is 
stopped, standing, or parked until the movement 
may be made with reasonable safety. tm 
41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes - Safety -
Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in speed 
- Signal flashing - Where prohibited. 
OXa) A person may not turn a vehicle or move 
right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until 
the movement can be made with reasonable safety 
and an appropriate signal has been given. 
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or 
UTAH CODE 
1987-1988 
to change lanes shall be given continuously for at 
least the last three seconds preceding the beginning 
of the turn or change. 
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease 
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appr-
opriate signal to the operator of any vehicle imme-
diately to the rear when there is opportunity to give 
a signal. 
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 41-
6-70 may not be flashed on one side only on a 
disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass' 
to operators of other vehicles approaching from the 
rear, or flashed on one side only of a parked vehicle 
except as necessary to comply with this section. 1*87 
41-6-70. Signals - Methods. 
A stop or turn signal when required shall be given 
either by the hand and arm or by signal lamps. iff? 
41-6-71. Signals - How made. 
Signals required to be given by hand and arm 
shall be given from the left side of the vehicle as 
follows: 
(1) Left turn: hand and arm extended horizont-
ally; 
(2) Right turn: hand and arm extended upward! 
and 
(3) Stop or decrease speed: hand and arm exte-
nded downward. 1987 
Article 9. Right-of-way 
41-6-72. Unregulated Intersection - Right-of-way 
between vehicles. 
41-6-72.10. Right of way - Stop or yield signals -
Collisions at intersections or Junctions of roadways -
Evidence. 
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield right-of-way. 
41-6-74. Repealed. 
41-6-74.10. Repealed.
 % 
41-6-75. Entering or crossing highway other than from 
another roadway - Yield right-of-way. 
41-6-75.5. Merging lanes - Yielding. 
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals -
Duties of respective drivers. 
41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon highway 
- Right of way. 
41-6-72. Unregulated intersection -
Right-of-way between vehicles. 
(1) Except as specified in Subsection (2), when 
more than one vehicle enters or approaches an 
unregulated or an all-way stop intersection from 
different highways at approximately the same time, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to the vehicle on the right unless 
otherwise directed by a peace officer. 
(2) When approaching an unregulated intersection 
the operator of a vehicle on a highway that does not 
continue beyond the intersection shall yield the right-
of-way to the operator of any vehicle on the inte-
rsecting highway. 1917 
41-6-72.10. Right-of-way - Stop or yield 
signals • Yield - Collisions at intersections or 
junctions of roadways - Evidence. 
(1) Preferential right-of-way may be indicated 
by stop signs or yield signs under Section 41-6-
99. 
(2) Except when directed to proceed by a peace 
officer, every operator of a vehicle approaching a 
stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, 
but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the 
near side of the intersection, but if none, then at a 
point nearest the intersecting roadway where the 
operator has a view of approaching traffic on the 
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intersecting roadway before entering it After having 
stopped, the operator shall yield the right-of-way 
to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on 
another roadway so closely as to constitute an 
immediate hazard dunng the time when the operator 
is moving across or within the intersection or junc-
tion of roadways. The operator shall yield the right-
of-way to pedestnans within an adjacent cross-
walk. 
(3Xa) The operator of a vehicle approaching a 
yield sign shall slow down to a speed reasonable for 
the existing conditions and if required for safety, 
shall stop as provided under Subsection (2) 
(b) After slowing or stopping, the operator shall 
yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the inte-
rsection or approaching on another roadway so 
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during 
the time the operator is moving across or within the 
intersection or junction of roadways The operator 
shall yield to pedestrians within an adjacent cross-
walk. If the operator is involved in a collision with a 
vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways 
or with a pedestrian at an adjacent crosswalk, after 
passing a yield sign without stopping, the collision is 
prima facie evidence of the operator's failure to 
yield the right-of-way, but is not considered 
negligence per se in determining liability for the 
accident. wrr 
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield 
right-of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the 
left shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle 
approaching from the opposite direction which is so 
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an 
immediate hazard \m 
41-6-74. Repealed. i*7 
41-6-74.10. Repealed. i«7 
41-6-75. Entering or crossing highway other than 
from another roadway - Yield right-of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross 
a highway from any place other than another 
highway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehi-
cles approaching on the highway to be entered or 
crossed IW7 
41-6-75.5. Merging lanes - Yielding. 
The operator of a vehicle traveling in a lane that 
is about to merge into another lane shall yield the 
right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the lane 
or lanes into which the lane of the operator is 
merging and which J&e so close as to be an immed-
iate hazard This section does not apply to entry 
lanes to limited access highways i9t7 
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals 
- Duties of respective drivers. 
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an author-
ized emergency vehicle using audible or visual 
signals under Sections 41-6-14, 41-6-132, or 41-
6-146 or of a peace officer vehicle lawfully using 
an audible or visual signal, the operator of every 
other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and 
immediately move to a position parallel to, and as 
close as possible to, the right hand edge or curb of 
the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop 
and remain there until the authonzed emergency 
vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed 
by a peace officer 
(2) This section does not relieve the operator of 
an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to 
drive with regard for the safety of all persons using 
the highway 19«7 
41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon 
highway - Right-of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-
way to a n y 
(1) authorized vehicle or pedestrian actually 
engaged in work upon a highway within any 
highway construction or maintenance area indicated 
by official traffic-control devices, or 
(2) authonzed vehicle obviously and actually 
engaged in work upon a highway when the vehicle 
displays lights meeting the requirements of Section 
41-6-140 20 urr 
Article 10. Pedestrians* Rights and Duties 
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices 
- Other controls. 
41-6-78. Pedcstriani' right of way • Duty of pedestrian. 
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right of way - Limits on 
pedestrians. 
41-6-79.10. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals -
Duties of operator - Pedestrian to yield 
41-6-79.20. Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or 
barrier prohibited. 
41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid 
pedestrians - Audible signals and caution. 
41-6-80.1. Operators to yield right-of-way to Mind 
pedestrian - Duties of blind pedestrian - Use of cane 
- Failure to yield - Liability. 
41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk • Operator to 
yield. 
41-641. Repealed. 
41-6-82. Walking along or upon roadways when there Is 
a sidewalk • Standing in roadway for prohibited 
purposes - Pedestrians under the Influence - Vehicle 
right-of-way. 
414-82.10. Unmarked crosswalk locations • 
Restrictions on pedestrian. 
41-6-82.50. Pedestrian vehicles. 
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control 
devices • Other controls. 
(1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any 
official traffic-control device specifically applicable 
to him unless otherwise directed by a peace officer 
(2) Pedestnans are subject to traffic and pedest-
rian-control signals under Sections 41-6-24 and 
41-6-25 19$7 
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right-of-way - Duty of 
pedestrian. 
( l)(a) When traffic-control signals are not in 
place or not in operatiGn, the operator of a vehicle 
shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or 
stopping if necessary to yield, to a pedestrian cros-
sing the roadway within a crosswalk when the ped-
estrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which 
the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is 
approaching so closely from the opposite half of the 
roadway as to be in danger This subsection does 
not apply under conditions of Subsection 41-6-
79(2). 
(b) A pedestrian may not suddenly leave a curb 
or other place of safety and walk or run into the 
path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute 
an immediate hazard 
(2) When a vehicle is stopped at a marked cross-
walk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersec-
tion to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the 
operator of any other vehicle approaching from the 
rear may not overtake and pass the stopped vehicle 
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right-of-way -
l i m i t s on pedestrians. 
(I) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point 
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stop, as far out of the way of traffic as practical. 
After stopping he shall yield to any traffic procee-
ding in either direction along the roadway he had 
been using. After yielding and complying with any 
official traffic-control device or peace officer reg-
ulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), the 
Department of Transportation and local authorities 
in their respective jurisdictions may cause official 
traffic-control devices to be placed and require and 
direct that a specific course be traveled by turning 
bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed, a 
person may not turn a bicycle other than as directed 
by the devices. \m 
41-6-87.7 . Bicycles and mopeds - T u r n s ignals. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person 
riding a bicycle or moped shall comply with Section 
41-6-69. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left when 
required shall be given continuously during not less 
than the last 100 feet traveled by the bicycle or 
moped before turning, and shall be given while the 
bicycle or moped is stopped waiting to turn. A 
signal by hand and arm need not be given continu-
ously if the hand is needed in the control or opera-
tion of the bicycle or moped. im 
41-6-S7.8. Bicycle and moped inspections - A t 
request of officer. 
A peace officer may at any time upon reasonable 
cause to believe that a bicycle or moped is unsafe or 
not equipped as required by law, or that its equip-
ment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require 
the person riding the bicycle or moped to stop and 
submit the bicycle or moped to an inspection and a 
test as appropriate. i9t7 
41-6-87.9 . Bicycle racing - When approved -
Prohibit ions • Exceptions - Authorized 
exemptions from traffic laws. 
(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited under 
Section 41-6-51, except as authorized in this 
section. 
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when 
a racing event is approved by state or local author-
ities on any highway under their respective jurisdi-
ctions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events 
may be granted only under conditions which assure 
reasonable safety for all race participants, specta-
tors, and other highway users, and which prevent 
unreasonable interference with traffic flow which 
would seriously inconvenience other highway users. 
(3) By agreement witlAhe approving authority, 
participants in an approved bicycle highway racing 
event may be exempted from compliance with any 
traffic laws otherwise applicable, if traffic control is 
adequate to assure the safety of all highway users. 
41-6-88. B icydes and mopeds - Carrying bundle 
• One hand on handle bars. 
A person operating a bicycle or moped may not 
carry any package, bundle, or article which prevents 
the use of both hands in the control and operation 
of the bicycle or moped. A person operating a 
bicycle or moped shall keep at least one hand on the 
handlebars at all times. \ni 
41-6-89. Bicycle • Prohibited e q u i p m e n t -
Brakes required. 
(1) A bicycle may not be equipped with, and a 
person may not use upon a bicycle, any siren or 
whistle. 
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake 
or brakes which enable its driver to stop the bicycle 
within 25 feet from a speed of 10 miles per hour on 
1987 
dry, level, clean pavement. 
41-6-90. B i c y d e s - Lamps and reflective 
material required. ,, 
(1) Every bicycle in use at the times described k 
Section 41-6-118 shall be equipped with a lamp 
on the front emitting a white light visible from a 
distance of at least 500 feet to the front and with * 
red reflector of a type approved by the department 
which is visible for 500 feet to the rear when directlj 
in front of lawful lower beams of head lamps on a 
motor vehicle. ! 
(2) Every bicycle when in use at the times descr 
ibed in Section 41-6-118 shall be equipped with 
reflective material of sufficient size and reflectivity 
to be visible from both sides for 500 feet when dir-
ectly in front of lawful lower beams of head lamp* 
on a motor vehicle, or in lieu of reflective material, 
with a lighted lamp visible from both sides from a 
distance of at least 500 feet. 
(3) A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with 
lights or reflectors in addition to those required by 
Subsections (1) and (2). I9ti 
Article 12. Railroad Trains and Safety Zones 
41-6-91 through 41-6-92. Repealed. 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks. 
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone. 
41-6-91 through 41-6-92. Repealed. 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks. 
(a) It is unlawful for the driver of any vehicle 
proceeding upon any track in front of a railroad 
train upon a street to fail to remove such vehicle 
from the track as soon as practicable after signal 
from the operator of such train. 
(b) When a railroad train has started to cross 
an intersection no driver of a vehicle shall drive 
upon or cross the tracks or in the path of such train 
within the intersection in front of such train. 195J 
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone . 
No vehicle shall at any time be driven through oi 
within a safety zone. 1*53 
Article 13. Special Stops Required 
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop -
Driving through, around or under gate or barrier 
prohibited. 
41-6-95.5. Trains - Interference with vehicles limited. 
41-6-96. Repealed. 
41-6-97. Railroad grade crossings • Certain vehicles 
must stop - Exceptions - Regulations. 
41-6-98. Dunes respecting crawler type tractor, power 
shovel, derrick or other equipment or structure. 
41-6-99. Designation of through highways - Stop signs, 
yield signs and traffic-control devices • Designation of 
intersections as locations for preferential right-of-way 
treatment. 
41-6-100. Vehicles emerging from alleys, buildings, 
private roads or driveways must stop prior to sidewalk 
area or street. 
41-6-100.10. School bus • Signs and light signals -
Flashing amber lights • Flashing red lights - Passing 
school bus - Duty to stop - Travel in opposite 
direction. 
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to s top 
• Driving through, around or under gate or 
barrier prohibited. 
(a) Whenever any person driving a vehicle appr-
oaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver of such 
vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than 
ten feet from the nearest track of such railroad and 
shall not proceed until he can do so safely when: 
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(1) A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal 
device gives warning of the immediate app roach of a 
train. 
(2) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a 
human flagman gives o r continues to give a signal 
of the approach or passage of a t ra in . 
(3) A rai lroad train approaching within app ro -
ximately 1,500 feet of the highway crossing emits a 
signal audible from such distance and such train by 
reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is an 
immediate hazard . 
(4) An approaching train is plainly visible and is 
in hazardous proximity to such crossing. 
(b) No person shall drive any vehicle through, 
around or under any crossing gate or barrier at a 
railroad crossing while such gates or barrier is closed 
or is being opened or closed. i*S3 
41-6-95.5. Trains - Interference with vehicles 
limited. 
N o person o r government agency shall operate 
any train in a manner to prevent vehicular use of 
any roadway for a period of time in excess of five 
consecutive minutes except: 
(1) When necessary to comply with signals affec-
ting the safety of the movement of t ra ins ; 
(2) When necessary to avoid striking any object or 
person on the t rack; 
(3) When the train is disabled; 
(4) When the train is in motion or while engaged 
in switching operations or as determined by local 
authority; 
(5) When there is no vehicular traffic waiting to 
use the crossing; o r 
(6) When necessary to comply with a governme-
ntal safety regulation. im 
41-6-96. Repealed. irn 
41-6-97. Railroad grade crossings - Certain 
vehicles must s top - Exceptions - Regulations. 
[(1)J Except as provided in subsection (2), the 
driver of any vehicle described in regulat ions issued 
pursuant t o subsection (3), before crossing at grade 
any track o r t racks of a rai lroad, shall s top within 
50 feet but no t less t h a n 10 feet f rom the nearest rail 
of such rai l road and while so s topped shall listen 
and look in bo th directions along such t rack for any 
approaching t ra in , and for signals indicating the 
approach of a t ra in and shall not proceed until it 
can be done safely. After s topping as required and 
upon proceeding when it is safe the driver shall 
cross only in a gear which will ensure no necessity 
for manual ly changing gears while traversing the 
crossing a n d the driver shall no t manual ly shift 
gears while so crossing. 
(2) This section shall not apply a t : 
(a) Any railroad grade crossing where traffic is 
controlled by a police officer or human flagman; 
(b) Any railroad grade crossing where traffic is 
regulated by a traffic control signal; 
(c) Any rai l road grade crossing where an offi-
cial traffic-control device gives notice that the 
stopping requirement imposed by this section does 
not apply. 
(3) The department of transportation shall adopt 
necessary regulations describing the vehicles which 
must comply with the stopping requirements of this 
section. In formulating the regulations the depart-
ment of transportation shall give consideration to 
the number of passengers carried by the vehicle and 
the hazardous nature of any substance carried by 
the vehicle. Such regulations shall correlate with and 
so far as possible conform to the most recent regu-
Vehicles 41-6-100.10. 
lation of the United States Department of Transp-
ortation. 1978 
41-6-98. Duties respecting crawler type tractor, 
power shovel, derrick or other equipment or 
structure. 
(1) N o person shall operate or move any crawler 
type t ractor , power shovel, derrick, roller or any 
equipment o r structure having normal operating 
speed of ten or less miles per hour or a vertical body 
or load clearance of less than 1/2 inch per foot of 
the distance between any two adjacent axles or in 
any event of less than nine inches measured above 
the level surface of a roadway upon or across any 
tracks a t a railroad grade crossing without first 
complying with this section. 
(2) Notice of any such intended crossing shall be 
given to a station agent of such railroad and a rea-
sonable t ime shall be given to such railroad to 
provide proper protection at such crossing. 
(3) Before making any such crossing the person 
operat ing or moving any such vehicle or equipment 
shall first s top the same not less than ten feet nor 
more than fifty feet from the nearest rail of such 
railway and while so stopped shall listen and look in 
bo th directions along such track for any approac-
hing train and for signals indicating the approach of 
a rai lroad train, and shall not proceed until the 
crossing can be made safely. 
(4) N o such crossing shall be made when warning 
is given by automat ic signal or crossing gates or a 
flagman or otherwise of the immediate approach of 
a rai lroad train or car . If a flagman is provided by 
the rai l road, movement over the crossing shall be 
made under his direction. \rt% 
41-6-99. Designation of through highways -
Stop signs? yield signs and traffic-control devices 
- Designation of intersections as locations for 
preferential right-of-way treatment. 
The department of transportation with reference 
to state highways and local authorities with refer-
ence to highways under their jurisdiction may erect 
and maintain stop signs, yield signs, or other official 
traffic-control devices to designate through high-
ways, or to designate intersections or other roadway 
junctions at which vehicular traffic on one or more 
of the roadways should yield or stop and yield 
before entering the intersection or junction. \m 
41-6-100. Vehicles emerging from alleys, 
buildings, private roads or driveways must stop 
prior to sidewalk area or street. 
The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, 
building, private r o a d o r driveway within a business 
or residence district shall s top such vehicle immedi-
ately prior t o driving on to a sidewalk or on to the 
sidewalk area extending across such alley, building 
entrance, road or driveway, or in the event there is 
no sidewalk area , shall s top a t the point nearest the 
street to be entered where the driver has a view of 
approaching traffic thereon. 197s 
41-6-100.10. School bus - Signs and light signals 
• Flashing amber lights • Flashing red lights -
Passing school bus - Duty to stop - Travel in 
opposite direction. 
( l)(a) Every school bus , when operated for the 
transporta t ion of school children, shall bear upon 
the front and rear of the bus a plainly visible sign 
containing the words "school bus" in letters not less 
t h a n eight inches in height, which shall be removed 
or covered when the vehicle is not in use for the 
transporta t ion of school children. 
(b) Every school bus , when operated for the 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE R u l e 3 3 
Advisory Committee Note. — There is no 
prior rule of appellate practice governing inter-
est on money judgments This rule clarifies the 
date interest is calculated on money judgments 
that are affirmed by the court, viz , the date 
the judgment was entered in the district court 
The rule is, in part, similar to Rule 37, FRAP 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and 
Error <* 941 
C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error * 1979 
A.L.R. — Date from which interest on judg-
ment starts running, as affected by modifica-
tion of amount of judgment on appeal, 4 
A L R 3 d 1221 
Right to interest pending appeal, 15 
A L R 3 d 411 
Running of interest on judgment where both 
parties appeal, 11 A L R 4th 1099 
Retrospective application and effect of state 
statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 
A L R 4th 694 
Key Numbers. — Interest ®^  39(2) 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court shall determine 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. 
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may 
take appropriate disciplinary action against counsel who inadequately repre-
sents his client on appeal. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
designed to ensure that parties and their coun-
sel understand that frivolous or clearly 
unmentonous appeals may result in the impo-
sition of single or double costs, including attor-
ney's fees, and damages, as well as disciplinary 
action against counsel 
Paragraph (a) In the event that a motion 
made during an appeal or the appeal, itself, is 
determined to be frivolous or undertaken for 
delay, this paragraph makes mandatory the 
imposition of just damages and single or double 
costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee 
The paragraph adopts Rule 38, FRAP, regard-
ing frivolous appeals, but enlarges the federal 
rule to include the mandatory imposition of 
costs for delay 
Paragraph (b) This paragraph acknowledges 
the inherent power of the supreme court to dis-
cipline counsel in appellate proceedings who 
the court determines has inadequately repre-
sented his or her client The paragraph is 
drawn, in part, from Rule 15(c), U S Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals See also Rule 40 in-
volving discipline of counsel and of a party who 
appears pro se 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Calfo v D C Stewart Co , 717 P 2d 
697 (Utah 1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and 
Error ^ 9 1 2 
C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error * 1358 
A.L.R. — Inherent power of federal district 
court to impose monetary sanctions on counsel 
in absence of contempt of court, 77 A L R Fed 
789 
Key Numbers. - Costs o=> 259 to 263 
457 
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT R u l e 
TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
(Enacted effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way tha t is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Enacted effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a 
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall 
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in 
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case. 
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21 
(b) Joint and s e p a r a t e petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
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Robert J. Debry, Esq. 
4001 South 700 East 
Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Re: Robert L. Gleave vs. The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, et al. 
Dear Bob: 
For the record, this letter is to confirm that on 
February 23, 1988 The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company and the Utah Railway Company (herein collectively 
"DRGW"; made an unconditional offer to settle the 
above-referenced litigation by paying your client, Robert L. 
Gleave, the ful4l amount of his judgment against DRGW, plus all 
accumulated post-judgment interest as of that date. DRGW 
offered to settle for the stated sum in consideration for a 
complete release of all claims and a stipulation of dismissal 
of the lawsuit with prejudice. As of February 23, 1988, DRGWfs 
offer of settlement was worth $625,868.81. Thereafter, by your 
letter of March 2, 1988, Mr. Gleave rejected DRGW's offer and 
instead made a $750,000 counter-offer. Mr. Gleave demanded 
that he be paid over $124,000 more than the total of the 
judgment amount plus all accumulated post-judgment interest. 
Mr. Gleave said he wanted the extra settlement money to 
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compensate him for his otherwise unsuccessful punitive damage 
claim. 
DRGW believes that Mr. Gleavefs rejection of DRGW's 
generous unconditional offer of settlement was in bad faith. 
DRGW further believes that Mr. Gleave wrongfully is prolonging 
this litigation in bad faith in the hopes of reaping an 
improper economic gain at the expense of both DRGW and the 
court system. Evidence of Mr. Gleavefs bad faith is found in 
his frivolous motion to the Court of Appeals that he be allowed 
to file two petitions for reconsideration. Mr. Gleave's motion 
to suspend the rules was patently frivolous because the rules 
expressly forbid consecutive petitions for reconsideration. 
The lower court granted a directed verdict in favor of DRGW on 
Mr. Gleave1s punitive damage claim, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed that ruling in every respect. Both courts have held 
that even when all the evidence is viewed in a light most 
favorable to Mr. Gleave, he has not proved a valid claim under 
Utah law for punitive damages. Both courts have held squarely 
that punitive damages have no place in this case. Mr. Gleavefs 
extreme demand for an extra $124,000 to cover his meritless 
punitive damage claim thus reflects bad faith under all the 
circumstances of this case. 
A certiorari petition filed with the Supreme Court by 
Mr. Gleave will be further evidence of Mr. Gleavefs improper 
tactics and motives. Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court provides for "just damages and single or double costs, 
including reasonable attorney s fees11 in cases where a litigant 
files a frivolous appeal or an appeal just to delay disposition 
of the case. DRGW's damages in this case could include but not 
be limited to all attorneys fees and post-judgment interest 
from and after February 23, 1988. 
For the foregoing reasons, DRGW hereby puts you and 
Mr. Gleave on notice that DRGW will resist any efforts by Mr. 
Gleave to recover any post-judgment interest, costs, or other 
expenses incurred after DRGW's unconditional offer of 
settlement. That is, as a matter of law and equity, DRGW will 
resist any effort by Mr. Gleave to profit by prolonging this 
litigation beyond February 23, 1988. In spite of DRGW's 
frustration over Mr. Gleave's recent delays, DRGW remains 
willing to settle the case for $625,868.81, provided that the 
VAN COTT, BAG LEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Robert J. Debry, Esq, 
March 30, 1988 
Page 3 
release and settlement agreement would have to be in a form 
acceptable to and signed by DRGW and Mr. Gleave. Just so there 
is no misunderstanding, please share this letter with your 
client. 
Very truly yours, 
Patrick J. O'Hara 
PJO/ce 
